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Abstract
Fertility has declined substantially in developing countries in the period since
1960, primarily as the result of increases in contraceptive prevalence. Little dispute
is found on this point, but considerable debate has arisen about the causes of the
increase in contraceptive prevalence. One unresolved issue is the causal contribu-
tion of changes in fertility desires. The sources of increase in contraceptive preva-
lence are analyzed in 22 countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa in the period
from the 1970s to the 1990s, using World Fertility Survey and Demographic and
Health Survey data. Through regression decomposition, change in prevalence is at-
tributed to change in fertility preferences (“composition”) and change in rates of use
within preference categories (“rates”). The rates component can be viewed as the
increase in prevalence resulting from increased implementation of preferences. Two
fertility-preference variables are examined, the desire for another birth and the dif-
ference between actual and ideal family size. The rates component dominates in all
22 countries, ranging between 75 percent and 90 percent in most of the countries. In
only two countries does the composition component exceed 25 percent. The results
refute demand-side explanations that ignore or dismiss the potential for substantial
increase in prevalence through the satisfaction of existing demand. Although changes
in fertility preferences account for a small proportion of the increase in prevalence,
this component weighs more heavily in societies at the early stages of transition and
in sub-Saharan Africa. In these settings, declining demand for children has been a
significant underlying cause of increases in contraceptive prevalence, and further
declines in demand are required if the transition is to proceed to replacement-level
fertility.
Since 1960, fertility has declined substantially in developing countries. Increased
practice of contraception is the chief direct cause of this historic development. Little
dispute has occurred on this point, but considerable disagreement has arisen about the
causes of the increase in contraceptive prevalence. The various factors that have been
posited as causes can be classified into two general groups, conventionally labeled “sup-
ply-side” and “demand-side” factors. The former term refers to the supply of contracep-
tives available to individuals, as determined by the geographical accessibility of family
planning services and the cost and quality of those services. The primary, but not exclu-
sive, focus of public and private family planning programs is this constellation of fac-
tors. The “demand-side” category encompasses all factors that affect the demand for
contraception. First and foremost among these factors is the desire to avoid pregnancy
(either temporarily or indefinitely). Demand-side factors also include social, psychic,
and cultural variables that either encourage or discourage contraceptive use, which in
the Easterlin synthesis model are termed the “nonaccess costs of fertility regulation”
(Easterlin and Crimmins 1985). This latter set of factors, which may well be key deter-
minants of the practice of contraception in some settings (Bongaarts and Bruce 1995;
Casterline et al. 1997), has received less attention in research on trends in contraception
and, in any case, typically these factors are not rigorously measured in demographic
surveys. The focus of a long-running debate, therefore, has been the relative contribu-
tions of changes in the desire to avoid pregnancy (changes in desired family size and
changes in birth-spacing preferences) as against changes in the supply of contraceptive
services (as determined by organized family planning programs).
The debate has been highly contentious, and for good reason, because at stake is
the rationale for substantial investments in family planning programs. The classic state-
ments of demographic transition theory portray fertility decline as a direct consequence
of decreased demand for children, itself a response to improved child survival and struc-
tural changes in the society that reduce the benefits and increase the costs of rearing
children (Notestein 1953; Davis 1963; Hirschman 1994). Although this view fits com-
fortably with the mainstream of social science theory on fertility, evidence from the first
fertility surveys conducted in poor countries in the 1960s suggested that the classic
theory, if not incorrect, at least needed to be enlarged. The surveys revealed that large
proportions of women wanted to avoid further births but were not practicing contracep-
tion (Mauldin 1965; Berelson 1966). The conclusion drawn from this evidence was that
a lack of interest in curtailing fertility was by no means the only, or perhaps even the
4
primary, explanation for the low levels of contraceptive prevalence in the poor countries
of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several influential interpretations of the historical
European fertility decline also stressed the causal impact of changes in the knowledge
and means of practicing contraception (Knodel and van de Walle 1979; Cleland and
Wilson 1987). A logical inference from this body of research is that improvements in
access to contraception can, in themselves, lead to increases in contraceptive preva-
lence; that is, contraceptive practice can respond to changes in supply-side factors in the
absence of accompanying changes in demand-side factors. This proposition presumes,
of course, the existence of unsatisfied demand for contraception. This view can be held
without denying that demand-side factors also make a substantial contribution to repro-
ductive change. Indeed, few demographers argue for one set of factors at the expense of
the others; rather, the consensus is that both demand-side and supply-side factors oper-
ate, and the empirical challenge is to determine the relative magnitude of the two, be-
cause this varies among settings (Freedman 1979).
The debate has continued in these general terms from the 1960s to the present.
One specific and critical issue in this debate has been the meaningfulness of the data on
fertility desires that are collected in demographic surveys. Hauser (1967) doubted their
validity and, by implication, the validity of the “KAP-gap” and “unmet need” estimates
cited from the 1960s to the present as evidence of the potential for fertility decline in the
absence of increases in the desire to avoid pregnancy. The weight of the accumulated
empirical research, however, is that survey data on fertility desires are valid, as assessed
either at the aggregate or at the individual level (Westoff and Ryder 1977; Hermalin et
al. 1979; Westoff 1990; De Silva 1991; Poo Chang and Tey 1994; Bankole and Westoff
1998). Hence the major protagonists on both sides of this debate in the 1990s have not
questioned the overall validity of these data. The analysis in this paper as well starts
from the premise that fertility desires are adequately measured by standard question-
naire items employed in the major international survey programs of the past three dec-
ades (the World Fertility Survey [WFS] program of the 1970s and 1980s and the Demo-
graphic and Health Survey [DHS] program of the 1980s and 1990s).
No one simple, decisive test of the relative merits of the supply-side and the
demand-side arguments exists. Research can be designed, however, that yields findings
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more consistent with one or the other argument, and that is the strategy followed here.
An implication of the demand-side argument is that changes in reproductive behavior
are due principally to changes in fertility desires. The supply-side argument, in contrast,
allows for substantial change in reproductive behavior in the absence of changes in
fertility desires; in such instances, the reproductive change can come about through a
more complete implementation of existing fertility desires (via use of contraceptives
and other fertility-regulation practices). This is the criterion Pritchett leans on most heavily
in his controversial attack on the supply-side argument (Pritchett 1994). He concludes
that declines in fertility in the past three decades have been due almost entirely to de-
clines in desired fertility, and from this and other evidence dismisses supply-side fac-
tors—family planning programs in particular—as making only the most minor contri-
bution to recent fertility declines. Other empirical analyses have arrived at a different
conclusion. Bongaarts (1992), in an analysis of DHS data collected in the late 1980s in
18 countries, shows that the implementation of fertility preferences through contracep-
tion varies by level of fertility, and from this infers that fertility decline can be attributed
in part to increased implementation of preferences. In a second empirical exercise, Bon-
gaarts (1993) decomposes fertility decline during the 1980s in 12 developing countries
and calculates that on average, the increased implementation of preferences accounts
for 66 percent of the observed fertility decline, a result that lends considerable credence
to the supply-side argument.1
These empirical studies were an effort to assess the extent to which change in
fertility and contraception can be characterized as “demand-driven.” With few excep-
tions (for example, Bongaarts 1993), however, this research employs inappropriate or
indirect analytical strategies: Cross-sectional analysis is used instead of over-time analysis,
and direct measurement of key variables (fertility preferences) is absent or inadequate.
These approximations and compromises are unnecessary, because more direct approaches
are feasible. In the case of contraceptive practice, given the existence in many countries
of two or more cross-sectional surveys conducted before and after substantial increases
in contraceptive prevalence, formal decompositions of the increase in prevalence can be
carried out in terms of hypothesized determinants, including fertility preferences. In this
paper, available data and conventional demographic methods are used to address the
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question: What fraction of the change in contraceptive prevalence can be attributed to
changes in fertility preferences?
DATA  AND M ETHODS
Survey data collected in the period from 1975 to 1997 in 22 countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America are analyzed and the results shown in Table 1. The selection of
countries was governed by two criteria: first, the availability of two surveys from either
the World Fertility Survey or Demographic and Health Survey programs, preferably
spaced at least ten years apart; second, a substantial increase in contraceptive preva-
lence, preferably of ten percentage points or more.2  In a few instances, countries are
selected that satisfy only one of these two criteria. In Uganda, the two surveys were
conducted less than ten years apart, but the increase in contraceptive prevalence was
substantial enough to justify analysis. In Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Yemen, the in-
crease in prevalence was less than ten percentage points but represented a doubling (or
greater) of the prevalence rate. In most countries, the first survey is a WFS from the late
1970s or early 1980s and the second survey is a DHS from the 1990s (or late 1980s in
some instances). In all but one country (Uganda), the surveys are separated by ten or
more years; in 11 countries, the gap is 15 years or more. In three countries (Brazil,
Senegal, and Uganda), data from two Demographic and Health Surveys are compared,
either because no WFS was conducted or, in the case of Senegal, because of noncom-
parable measurement of a key variable in the WFS. The standard recode file for each
survey is used.
Surveys conducted under the auspices of these two programs are comparable in
their basic features (Westoff and Bankole 1999). For both sets of surveys, relatively
large probability samples of women of reproductive age were interviewed.3  The ques-
tionnaires for the two sets are broadly similar. Items for the two key variables in this
analysis—contraceptive behavior and fertility preferences—are not identical, but they
resemble each other closely enough that it is safe to assume that incomparable measure-
ment cannot account for much of the observed differences between surveys. Some dif-
ferences in the structure of the WFS and DHS questionnaires deserve mention, however,
because they affected the design of this analysis.
Table 1 Percentage of  currently married women aged 15–44 using a contraceptive
method at first and second surveys, and percentage-point increase in contraceptive use,
22 countries
Percent Percent
Date using Date of using at Percentage-point
of first at first second second increase in con-
Region/country survey survey survey survey traceptive use
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire 1980 3.0 1994 11.4 8.4
Ghana 1979 9.9 1993 20.5 10.6
Kenya 1978 6.8 1993 31.4 24.7
Senegal 1986 4.8 1997 12.6 7.9
Uganda 1988 4.4 1995 14.4 10.0
North Africa and West Asia
Egypt 1980 24.6 1995 49.2 24.6
Morocco 1980 20.3 1995 42.2 21.9
Tunisia 1978 32.0 1988 50.7 18.6
Turkey 1978 41.5 1993 64.5 23.0
Yemen 1979 1.2 1991 8.3 7.2
South and Southeast Asia
Bangladesh 1976 8.2 1996 49.0 40.8
Indonesia 1976 27.8 1993 56.1 28.3
Nepal 1976 2.3 1996 28.0 25.6
Philippines 1978 38.7 1998 48.7 10.0
Sri Lanka 1975 33.7 1987 60.7 27.0
Thailand 1975 35.7 1987 67.5 31.8
Latin America
Brazil 1986 66.9 1996 76.2 9.3
Colombia 1976 42.6 1995 70.9 28.2
Dominican Republic 1975 33.4 1996 63.1 29.7
Mexico 1977 32.7 1987 54.5 21.8
Paraguay 1979 38.6 1990 49.4 10.8
Peru 1978 33.4 1996 65.1 31.6
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First, the sample for questions about contraceptive use at the time of the survey in
the WFS is limited to women currently in union, whereas for the DHS, questions also
were asked of never-married women (where they were interviewed) and of formerly
married women. The present analysis is restricted to women currently in union (legal or
consensual), which, in any case, is the conventional denominator for the contraceptive
prevalence rate. A further difference is that women who perceived themselves to be no
longer capable of conceiving (that is, infecund) were not asked in the WFS about contra-
ceptive use at the time of the survey. Hence, for comparability, infecund women are
classified as nonusers in both sets of surveys, with the exception of those women who
are contraceptively sterilized. Note that infecund women are retained in the analysis
here, so that all calculations are based on all women currently in union. To reduce the
possibility of bias due to the different treatment of infecund women in the WFS and
DHS questionnaires, women aged 45-49 are excluded from this analysis.
Second, the depth of measurement of the desire for another child, a key explana-
tory variable, differs between the two survey programs. In the DHS, women who want
additional children are asked how soon they want the next child. This question permits
women who want to postpone the next birth (and hence have a motive to practice contra-
ception) to be distinguished from women who want another child relatively soon. In
contrast, only a few WFS surveys included a follow-up question on how soon the next
child was wanted. The analysis is thereby necessarily restricted to the demand for con-
traception for family-size limitation, and, as a result, this research probably understates
the degree to which trends in contraceptive prevalence are a response to changes in
fertility preferences. Other research suggests, however, that in most settings, increases
in the desire to space children contribute far less to overall trends in contraception and
fertility than do increases in the desire to limit family size (Bongaarts 1992). (Note that
trends in the implementation of spacing preferences are another matter altogether. In
sub-Saharan Africa, increases in the implementation of spacing preferences appear to
account for a substantial fraction of recent trends in contraception [Caldwell et al. 1992].)
A further difference is that in the WFS, information about this desire for another child
was not asked of infecund women (just as these women were not asked about current
contraceptive use). In this analysis, infecund women are grouped with women who indi-
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cated that they wanted another child, because both sets of women lack a motivation to
use contraceptives for the purpose of family-size limitation. This rule is applied to data
from both the WFS and the DHS surveys for consistency.
The two key variables for this analysis—contraceptive use and fertility prefer-
ences—are measured as follows: Contraceptive use has two categories: using at the time
of the survey and not using. In most countries, the list of contraceptive methods are not
identical in the WFS and DHS, but the differences appear to be too slight to have an
impact on the results.4
The principal explanatory factor, fertility preference, is measured through two
variables: the desire for additional children and the difference between the actual and
ideal number of children. The construction of the two variables is described in turn.
Desire for additional children has two categories: wanting more and not wanting more.
For nonpregnant women, classification is straightforward, based on the response to a
direct questionnaire item.5 ,6 For pregnant women, the procedure is more complicated,
because demand for contraception at the survey date is a matter of whether or not the
current pregnancy was wanted, and in some countries this information was not gathered.
Where information on the wantedness of the current pregnancy is provided by both
surveys,7  a pregnant woman is classified as wanting no additional children if her preg-
nancy at the time of the survey was unwanted and if she did not desire another child
after the one she was carrying. Where this information is not provided by both surveys,
a pregnant woman is classified as wanting no additional children if her number of living
children was equal to or greater than her desired number of children and if she did not
desire another child after the one she was carrying.
The difference between the actual and ideal number of children is constructed as the
simple arithmetical difference between the two variables (actual minus ideal).8  This differ-
ence is interpreted as an indicator of the extent to which desired fertility has been attained.
The closer the absolute difference is to zero, the closer is the agreement between desired and
achieved fertility. A negative number indicates that the desired fertility is yet to be attained,
whereas a positive number indicates that desired fertility has been exceeded. Where a nu-
meric value for the ideal number of children is not provided, a value is imputed.9  For conve-
nience in this paper, the shorthand label “actual–ideal gap” is used for this variable.
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Including two fertility-preference variables—the desire for additional children,
and the actual–ideal gap—is a departure from most recent research, where the practice
has been to rely entirely on the first variable. Controlling for the desire for additional
children, which is a simple dichotomy, the actual-ideal gap is considered to capture the
strength of the desire to avoid pregnancy. Consistent with this interpretation, among
those who indicate that they want no additional children, those who have attained or
exceeded their ideal family size are more likely to use contraceptives in virtually every
survey analyzed in this paper. One issue addressed in the empirical analysis is the extent
to which the actual-ideal gap increases the overall explanatory power of fertility prefer-
ences, and, further, whether the marginal gain from including the actual-ideal gap varies
by social factors such as stage of fertility transition and region.
The primary aim in this analysis is to determine the extent to which changes in
fertility preferences can account for changes in contraceptive prevalence. To accom-
plish this, a regression-decomposition approach is explored. (see Althauser and Wigler
1972; Iams and Thornton 1975; and Firebaugh 1996.) Several previous studies have
used essentially the same methodology in regional (Castro-Martin and Njogu 1994) and
country-specific (Njogu 1991) studies of contraceptive change. In separate estimations
for each survey, contraceptive use is regressed on the two fertility-preference variables
specified above.10












where U is an indicator of contraceptive use (1 = use, 0 = nonuse), a is the regression inter-
cept, b are the coefficients for the effects of P, P are indicators of fertility preferences,  is the
regression disturbance, and 1,2 denote first and second survey, respectively.
Equations 1a and 1b can be combined in an expression for change in mean levels


















where the underscore denotes a mean value.
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For the purposes of decomposition, equation (2) is rearranged and expanded
U2 – U1= (a2 – a1) + P(b2 – b1) + b(P2 – P1)
or
∆U  = ∆a + P∆b + b∆P, (3)
where ∆ indicates a first difference.
Change is now decomposed in terms of three components: (i) change in the inter-
cepts [∆a]; (ii) change in the coefficient (or “effect”) of preferences [∆b], weighted by
the average composition [P]; and, (iii) change in composition of women in terms of
preferences [∆P], weighted by the average coefficient [b]. The first two components
together comprise the total contribution of changes in coefficients. Any one of the compo-
nents can be positive or negative in sign, but by definition, they must sum to the total
amount of change in U (that is, to 100 percent if the decomposition is given as a percent).
Having obtained these decomposition results, the observed change in contracep-
tive prevalence can be expressed as the simple sum of two components: changes in
fertility preferences and changes in the effects of preferences on use (that is, the regres-
sion coefficients).11 Following the terminology of classic demographic decomposition
(Kitagawa 1955), the first component is labeled “composition” and the second compo-
nent “rates.” Contraceptive prevalence can change as a result of either mechanism—
changing preference structures, or changing propensity to use within preference catego-
ries (much of which can be regarded as changes in the “implementation of preferences”12).
Either can account for a relatively small or large part of the observed change in prevalence.
RESULTS
Trends in Contraceptive Use and Fertility Preferences
For each country, Table 1 shows the dates of the two surveys and the percentage
of currently married women aged 15–44 using contraceptives at the time of each survey.
In all 22 countries, contraceptive prevalence increased during the intersurvey years. The
highest percentage-point increase is found in Bangladesh (41 points), followed by Thai-
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land and Peru (32 points), Dominican Republic (30 points), Indonesia and Colombia (28
points), and Sri Lanka (27 points). At the other extreme, countries with less than a ten
percentage-point increase are Yemen (7 points), Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal (8 points),
and Brazil (9 points). Note that the length of the intersurvey period differs among coun-
tries, and this difference accounts for some of the variability in the increase in preva-
lence, although, in fact, some of the larger increases occur over relatively short periods
(for example, in Thailand and Sri Lanka).
Summary statistics for fertility-preference variables are shown in Table 2. The
indicators shown are: the percentage of women wanting no additional children, the mean
ideal number of children, the mean actual–ideal gap, and the percentage of women for
whom the actual number of children equals or exceeds their ideal. With only a few
exceptions, all indicators suggest that the demand for fertility limitation increased dur-
ing the intersurvey period. The largest percentage-point increase in the desire for no
additional children is Kenya (32 points), followed by Nepal (25 points), and Ghana (19
points). These countries were at the onset of transition at the time of the first survey.
Half of the 22 countries recorded less than a ten percentage-point increase in the desire
to stop childbearing: Colombia, Philippines, and Senegal (4 points), Brazil (5 points),
Peru and Thailand (7 points), Egypt and Paraguay (8 points), Dominican Republic (9
points), and Uganda and Indonesia (9.7 and 9.8, respectively). Two of these countries
were in the early stages of transition in the period under observation (Uganda and Sene-
gal), and the rest were at later stages.
Table 2 also shows that in all countries except Yemen, the ideal number of chil-
dren declined between the two surveys, and the difference between living and ideal
number of children became more positive in all countries except the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, and Thailand. Moreover, the percentage of women for whom the actual number
of children exceeds the ideal increased in all countries except the three Asian countries
just mentioned. (Note that in these three countries, the increases in the proportion desir-
ing no additional children are modest.) In general, these patterns are consistent with
increases in the percentage desiring no additional children. What is especially striking
about the trends in the ideal number of children (and, accordingly, the actual–ideal gap)
is the magnitude of the decline in sub-Saharan Africa, exceeding one child in all five
Table 2 Percentage of currently married women aged 15–44 wanting no more children,
mean ideal number of children, mean actual–ideal gap, and the percentage of women for
whom their actual number of living children equals or exceeds their ideal,  22 countries
Percent for
Mean ideal Actual–ideala whom actual
Region/country/ Percent who number number number equals
dates of surveys want no more of children of children or exceeds ideal
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire
1980 3.1 8.1 -5.3 3.5
1994 14.5 6.0 -2.8 18.8
Ghana
1979 8.0 6.0 -3.1 9.9
1993 27.3 4.8 -1.9 25.7
Kenya
1978 11.5 7.0 -3.2 17.4
1993 43.0 4.0 -0.3 51.1
Senegal
1986 14.5 7.1 -4.2 14.2
1997 18.9 5.8 -2.6 23.2
Uganda
1988 15.0 6.7 -3.5 15.1
1995 24.7 5.6 -2.5 20.1
North Africa and West Asia
Egypt
1980 46.4 4.0 -1.0 45.6
1995 54.5 2.9 0.0 61.6
Morocco
1980 31.6 4.8 -1.2 39.0
1995 42.6 3.8 -0.5 48.0
Tunisia
1978 37.8 4.1 -0.5 48.4
1988 52.4 3.5 -0.2 54.3
Turkey
1978 49.9 3.0 -0.2 55.2
1993 61.3 2.4 0.1 66.2
Yemen
1979 13.6 5.3 -2.7 17.1
1991 29.4 5.5 -1.5 35.8
. . . /
Table 2 (continued)
Percent for
Mean ideal Actual–ideala whom actual
Region/country/ Percent who number number number equals
dates of surveys want no more of children of children or exceeds ideal
South and Southeast Asia
Bangladesh
1976 56.8 3.8 -0.8 45.1
1996 69.5 2.5 -0.1 60.1
Indonesia
1976 30.3 4.2 -1.4 33.2
1993 40.1 2.8 -0.5 47.6
Nepal
1976 25.2 4.0 -1.6 33.0
1996 50.4 2.9 -0.2 56.8
Philippines
1978 45.5 4.3 -0.5 50.0
1998 49.5 3.4 -0.5 49.5
Sri Lanka
1975 49.6 3.7 -0.4 54.3
1987 61.7 3.0 -0.4 53.1
Thailand
1975 49.3 3.6 -0.5 49.9
1987 56.5 2.7 -0.5 49.9
Latin America
Brazil
1986 61.8 3.0 -0.3 50.9
1996 66.7 2.5 -0.1 60.4
Colombia
1976 55.3 4.1 -0.3 45.9
1995 59.1 2.8 0.1 56.2
Dominican Republic
1975 44.5 4.6 -1.1 33.2
1996 53.4 3.3 -0.7 41.7
Mexico
1977 45.2 4.4 -0.6 43.7
1987 58.2 3.3 -0.2 53.9
Paraguay
1979 25.4 5.1 -1.8 20.2
1990 33.6 4.4 -1.2 30.4
Peru
1978 53.5 3.7 -0.2 51.9
1996 60.6 2.6 0.2 61.7
a Number of living children minus ideal number of children.
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countries and exceeding two children in Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. The increases in the
proportion desiring no additional children are also substantial in this region, but, in fact,
the declines in ideal family size outpace these increases in the expressed desire to stop
childbearing. In African societies, a precipitous decline in the total number of children
desired appears to be a prominent feature of the early stages of fertility transition. As
shown below, taking this decline into account is important for assessing the overall
contribution of changes in fertility preferences to trends in contraceptive prevalence.
Decomposition of Change in Contraception
The data on trends in fertility preferences presented in Table 2 reveal increases in
the desire to limit childbearing, some of them substantial, in all regions. Only in the
Philippines and Thailand is any basis found for doubting that the desire to stop increased
between the surveys. A strong individual-level relationship between fertility preferences
and contraceptive behavior is well documented (Westoff and Bankole 1995; United
Nations forthcoming). From this relationship, it follows that the increased demand for
fertility limitation must have led to increases in contraceptive prevalence during the
same intersurvey period. This is merely casual observation, however. The question can
be articulated in a manner that leads to more precise quantification: What fraction of the
increase in contraceptive use can be attributed to changes in fertility preferences?
The answer to this question is provided in Table 3, which presents the percentage
decomposition of the increase in contraceptive prevalence into contributions of “com-
position” (that is, changes in fertility preferences) and “rates” (that is, changing rates of
use within categories of fertility preferences). The composition component is that por-
tion of the increase in prevalence that can be attributed to decreased demand for chil-
dren, whereas the rates component reflects increased implementation of preferences. A
clear message emerges from Table 3: Increases in contraceptive prevalence are due over-
whelmingly to increased rates of use within preference categories, not to changes in
fertility preferences. The rates component accounts for more than 70 percent of the
increase in contraceptive prevalence in 20 of the 22 countries, and for more than 80
percent in more than two-thirds of the countries. In only two countries does decreased
demand for children (the composition component) account for more than one-fourth of
the increase in prevalence (Ghana [39 percent] and Kenya [31 percent]). In three coun-
Table 3   Decomposition of the change in contraceptive prevalence among currently
married women aged 15–44, 22 countries
Percentage-point
change in
Region/country/ contracepitve Contribution of
dates of surveys prevalence Compositiona Ratesb Total
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire, 1980, 1994 8.4 24.2 75.8 100.0
Ghana, 1979, 1993 10.6 39.2 60.8 100.0
Kenya, 1978, 1993 24.7 31.3 68.7 100.0
Senegal, 1986, 1997 7.9 24.9 75.1 100.0
Uganda, 1988, 1995 10.0 16.2 83.8 100.0
North Africa and West Asia
Egypt, 1980, 1995 24.6 19.4 80.6 100.0
Morocco, 1980, 1995 21.9 17.9 82.1 100.0
Tunisia, 1978, 1988 18.6 25.2 74.8 100.0
Turkey, 1978, 1993 23.0 17.7 82.3 100.0
Yemen, 1979, 1991 7.2 18.8 81.2 100.0
South and Southeast Asia
Bangladesh, 1976, 1996 40.8 13.5 86.5 100.0
Indonesia, 1976, 1993 28.3 13.0 87.0 100.0
Nepal, 1976, 1996 25.6 24.5 75.5 100.0
Philippines, 1978, 1998 10.0 13.8 86.2 100.0
Sri Lanka, 1975, 1987 27.0 15.2 84.8 100.0
Thailand, 1975, 1987 31.8 8.8 91.2 100.0
Latin America
Brazil, 1986, 1996 9.3 12.1 87.9 100.0
Colombia, 1976, 1995 28.2 3.5 96.5 100.0
Dominican Republic, 1975, 1996 29.7 12.0 88.0 100.0
Mexico, 1977, 1987 21.8 16.5 83.5 100.0
Paraguay, 1979, 1990 10.8 17.8 82.2 100.0
Peru, 1978, 1996 31.6 3.6 96.4 100.0
Note: For discussion of  regression decomposition shown here, see text.
aComposition of the population according to fertility preferences: desire for additional births and the
actual–ideal gap. bRates of use within fertility-preference categories.
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tries, decreased demand accounts for less than 10 percent of the increase in prevalence
(Thailand [9 percent], Peru [4 percent], and Colombia [4 percent]). In short, increased
implementation of fertility preferences, not changing demand for children, is the pri-
mary explanation for the increase in contraceptive use during this period of time in these
countries.
As noted above, this analysis departs from most recent research in making use of
two fertility-preference measures: the desire for another birth and the difference be-
tween the number of living children and the ideal number of children. The gain from
including the actual–ideal gap is examined in Table 4, which shows the composition
component in decompositions based solely upon the desire for another birth, solely on
the actual–ideal gap, and based upon the two together (as in the decomposition in Table
3).13 Comparing the three columns in Table 4, the countries are seen to be roughly evenly
split into those where the desire to have no more children accounts for more of the
increase in prevalence and those where the actual–ideal gap accounts for more of the
increase in prevalence. Given that use of the “want no more” variable is conventional,
the major question to ask here is what is gained by inclusion of the actual–ideal gap.
Inclusion of this additional fertility-preference variable results in substantial increases
in the composition component in the sub-Saharan African countries, more than dou-
bling this component in Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Outside of sub-Saharan Africa, the
inclusion of the actual–ideal gap also leads to substantial increases in the composition
component in Egypt and Yemen. With the exception of Egypt, the countries where the
actual–ideal gap makes a substantial contribution are countries near the onset of fertility
transition, and most of these countries are also African. As noted above in the discussion
of Table 2, sub-Saharan African societies are characterized by a sharp decline in ideal
family size in the early stages of transition. Table 4 indicates that a failure to incorporate
this aspect of fertility transition—unmistakably a feature of African transitions, and per-
haps of the early stages of transitions in other regions as well—leads to a serious under-
estimation of the causal impact of changing fertility preferences.
The finding that change in prevalence is due mainly to changing rates of use
within preference categories is examined in more detail in Table 5. This table shows
trends in contraceptive prevalence separately for two fertility-preference categories
Table 4   Percentage of the change in contraceptive prevalence due to changes in
fertility preferences among currently married women aged 15–44, 22 countries
Percentage of change in prevalence  due to
Region/country/ Desire to stop Actual–ideal Desire to stop and
dates of surveys childbearing alone gap alone actual–deal gap
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire, 1980, 1994 9.2 23.9 24.2
Ghana, 1979, 1993 25.2 33.5 39.2
Kenya, 1978, 1993 24.4 27.0 31.3
Senegal, 1986, 1997 4.5 27.9 24.9
Uganda, 1988, 1995 10.8 16.6 16.2
North Africa and West Asia
Egypt, 1980, 1995 13.2 29.5 19.4
Morocco, 1980, 1995 14.7 16.2 17.9
Tunisia, 1978, 1988 25.3 12.7 25.2
Turkey, 1978, 1993 18.6 7.1 17.7
Yemen, 1979, 1991 12.3 16.4 18.8
South and Southeast Asia
Bangladesh, 1976, 1996 12.6 6.4 13.5
Indonesia, 1976, 1993 11.9 20.5 13.0
Nepal, 1976, 1996 22.0 19.6 24.5
Philippines, 1978, 1998 13.6 -0.1 13.8
Sri Lanka, 1975, 1987 17.2 0.4 15.2
Thailand, 1975, 1987 8.7 0.4 8.8
Latin America
Brazil, 1986, 1996 13.6 3.6 12.1
Colombia, 1976, 1995 3.9 2.2 3.5
Dominican Republic, 1975, 1996 12.0 4.8 12.0
Mexico, 1977, 1987 16.6 5.6 16.5
Paraguay, 1979, 1990 16.2 11.7 17.8
Peru, 1978, 1996 5.0 2.1 3.6
Table 5   Adjusted percentage of currently married women aged 15–44 practicing con-
traception, by their desire for another birth, 22 countries
Region/country/ Want more Want no more Absolute Log odds
dates of surveys children children difference difference
Sub-Saharan Africa
Côte d’Ivoire
1980 2.8 8.1 5.3 1.1
1994 10.5 15.3 4.8 0.4
Ghana
1979 9.0 16.4 7.4 1.7
1993 17.3 27.1 9.8 0.6
Kenya
1978 5.3 16.0 10.7 1.2
1993 19.8 45.8 26.0 1.2
Senegal
1986 4.1 6.7 2.6 0.5
1997 11.9 14.6 2.7 0.2
Uganda
1988 3.0 9.1 6.1 1.2
1995 10.5 24.1 13.6 1.0
North Africa and West Asia
Egypt
1980 11.5 35.7 24.2 1.5
1995 22.4 71.5 49.1 2.2
Morocco
1980 10.0 39.1 29.1 1.8
1995 30.0 57.4 27.4 1.1
Tunisia
1978 21.9 46.8 24.9 1.1
1988 34.5 65.4 30.9 1.3
Turkey
1978 26.7 56.2 29.5 1.3
1993 31.9 84.4 52.5 2.4
Yemen
1979 0.6 2.9 2.3 1.6
1991 5.6 13.4 7.8 1.0
. . . /
Table 5 (continued)
Region/country/ Want more Want no more Absolute Log odds
dates of surveys children children difference difference
South and Southeast Asia
Bangladesh
1976 1.7 13.5 11.8 2.2
1996 9.7 65.9 56.2 2.9
Indonesia
1976 18.6 47.5 28.8 1.4
1993 39.4 80.6 41.2 1.9
Nepal
1976 0.6 5.3 4.7 2.2
1996 6.0 49.4 43.4 2.7
Philippines
1978 23.5 56.8 33.3 1.5
1998 28.5 69.4 40.9 1.7
Sri Lanka
1975 15.1 51.9 36.8 1.8
1987 39.0 74.8 35.8 1.5
Thailand
1975 18.2 53.7 35.5 1.7
1987 40.3 88.2 47.9 2.4
Latin America
Brazil
1986 45.5 79.8 34.3 1.6
1996 44.4 90.7 46.3 2.5
Colombia
1976 32.5 50.7 18.2 0.8
1995 44.9 88.2 43.3 2.2
Dominican Republic
1975 17.9 52.8 34.9 1.6
1996 34.9 87.8 52.9 2.6
Mexico
1977 22.2 45.5 23.3 1.1
1987 34.6 68.7 34.1 1.4
Paraguay
1979 35.9 46.4 10.5 0.4
1990 39.2 69.5 30.3 1.3
Peru
1978 23.6 42.1 18.5 0.9
1996 47.1 76.2 29.1 1.3
Note:  Percentages are adjusted through logistic regression analysis.  The other independent variable
is the actual–ideal gap.
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(women who want more children and those who want no more). Consistent with the
predominance of the rates component in the decompositions in Table 3, in most coun-
tries contraceptive use increases substantially in both preference categories. Taking the
analysis a step further, we can ask whether the increase in use tends to be sharper in one
category as compared with the other (or, phrased differently, whether the differential in
use between preference categories widens or narrows over time). The answer depends
on the measure used for the comparison. If the measure is simply percentages (that is,
the contraceptive prevalence rates), the increases are generally larger in the “want no
more” category, resulting in a widening over time of the differential between the “want
more” and “want no more” categories (exceptions are Côte d’Ivoire, Morocco, and Sri
Lanka) (see column 3 of Table 5). However, percentage-point differences do not adjust
for the floors and ceilings in the contraceptive prevalence rate, which, of course, cannot
fall below 0 percent or exceed 100 percent. A common strategy for coping with this
problem is to apply the logit transform.14 Once we apply this transform, no dominant
pattern emerges: The differential widens in 14 countries, reflecting more rapid increase
in contraceptive use in the “want no more” category, and narrows in seven countries,
reflecting a faster rate of increase in the “want more” category (see column 4 of Table
5). In Kenya, the rate of increase is roughly the same in the two preference categories.
DISCUSSION
The major finding of this research is that the substantial increases in contracep-
tive prevalence in the period since the 1970s in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were
less the result of increased demand for family-size limitation and more the result of
satisfaction of existing demand. This finding is clearly at odds with that of those who
assign a dominant causal role to changes in fertility desires, and it certainly refutes the
more extreme view that increased implementation of existing preferences has made only
a trivial contribution to the fertility declines of the past three decades (Pritchett 1994). In
this respect, the empirical results presented in this paper are more compatible with a
supply-side than a demand-side interpretation, although a qualification must be placed
on this judgment: The more complete implementation of preferences reflected in the
rates component may be the result of improved supply of contraceptives, but it might
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also be a consequence of the lowering of nonaccess costs of using contraceptives (the
cultural, social, and psychic costs). Population policies and programs may have a great
deal or little to do with the lowering of nonaccess costs. Social diffusion processes oper-
ating relatively independently of explicit policies and programs can make a substantial
contribution to the lowering of such costs (Rosero-Bixby and Casterline 1993; Bon-
gaarts and Watkins 1996; Montgomery and Casterline 1998).
We must be cautious about extending these findings beyond the specific histori-
cal period and regions on which they are based. Most fertility transitions, if observed
over the entire period from pre- to post-transition, are probably characterized by large
declines in desired fertility (on the order of two or more births), without which it would
be difficult to imagine a fertility decline of anything like the same magnitude. Certainly,
fertility declines in sub-Saharan Africa, if they are to proceed as far as replacement-
level fertility (or, to be more conservative, to total fertility rates of three births or fewer
per woman), would appear to require substantial departures from pretransition desires
for six or more births on average. By this reasoning, substantial declines in the demand
for children must be considered a fundamental driving force of fertility transition, and,
indeed, they are the necessary condition for fertility transition.
In making this argument, however, a great risk is run of exaggerating both the
causal centrality of a decline in the demand for children and the magnitude of such
declines, especially if the measure is number of children surviving to adulthood rather
than number of births (Wilson and Airey 1999; Cleland 1999). A modest number of
children surviving to adulthood may have been the desired outcome in most societies
for most of human history. If so, pre- and post-transition societies may differ less in the
prevalence of aspirations for large families than has been imagined, and fertility transi-
tion is less accurately portrayed as a fundamental re-valuation of children and more as a
process of replacing those who have died rather than as an unintentional mechanism for
limiting family size with contraception (and other fertility-inhibiting behaviors, such as
induced abortion and delayed marriage). According to this argument, demand for sur-
viving children changes less than might be imagined over the course of fertility transi-
tion (at the same time as the demand for live births might decline substantially). Al-
though some of the central tenets of the demand-side explanation can be reconciled with
this argument, it describes a historical process that consists at its core of a shift toward
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increasing reliance on contraception for the achievement of family-size desires; that is,
fertility transition is driven by increasing implementation of fertility preferences through
contraceptive practice. The empirical results shown here, themselves specific to poor
countries in the latter decades of the twentieth century, are consistent with this more
sweeping depiction of the forces underlying fertility transition.
Whether or not inferences can be made from the results presented in this paper to
larger questions about the nature of fertility transition, the results indicate that signifi-
cant increases in contraceptive prevalence can occur without accompanying changes in
fertility desires. This finding is an important empirical verification of the premise that
has justified population policy and the development of family planning programs in
many countries during the past three decades, namely that unsatisfied demand for con-
traception is widespread and that satisfying this demand will lead to large increases in
contraceptive prevalence. At the same time, changes in fertility desires cannot be dis-
missed entirely, as these account, on average, for one-fifth of the observed increase in
prevalence in the countries and period under examination. This fraction is relatively
larger in those societies with the highest fertility, in particular in sub-Saharan African
societies. Here, more complete implementation of existing fertility preferences will not,
in itself, lead to high levels of contraceptive prevalence. Rather, in these societies, trans-
formation of fertility-preference structures toward much smaller family-size desires will
be an additional and necessary component of fertility transition, and the design of popu-
lation policies and family planning programs should be informed by this fact.
Notes
1 Several excellent recent single-country studies do not estimate directly the con-
tribution of fuller implementation of preferences; rather they demonstrate that
changes in factors associated with the demand for children, such as schooling,
structure of the economy, and child survival, appear to account for most of the
observed change in contraception and/or fertility: For Indonesia in the 1980s, see
Gertler and Molyneaux 1994; for Iran from the 1950s to the 1970s, see Raftery et
al. 1995. These same factors can also influence the implementation of prefer-
ences, however, and thus these studies do not address directly the question of
how much of the fertility change can be attributed solely to changes in fertility
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desires. In a study of Prussia in the late nineteenth century, Lee et al. (1994)
conclude that although reductions in the demand for children account for the
largest part of the fertility decline, readiness to practice contraception also makes
a substantial contribution (accounting for one-sixth to one-third of the decline,
under various specifications). The authors’ calculations rely on indirect indica-
tors of both the readiness to use contraceptives and the demand for children. In a
less formal, more interpretative analysis of the countries of South Asia, Shah and
Cleland (1993) argue that considerable unsatisfied demand for fertility regula-
tion exists in these societies, and hence, in the short term, substantial fertility
decline could occur with little or no change in fertility desires.
2 Several countries that might appear to satisfy these criteria are not included ei-
ther because one of the data sets is not available for analysis (Jordan), because a
key variable is measured differently in the two surveys (Cameroon—fertility pref-
erences), or because examination of the data raises serious concerns about the
validity of the measurement of a key variable (Bolivia—fertility preferences).
3 In Indonesia and Yemen, the DHS covered more regions than did the WFS. Those
regions not sampled in the WFS are excluded here. In Indonesia, the DHS sample
is limited to the following provinces: DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI
Yogyarkarta, East Java, and Bali. In Yemen, the DHS sample is limited to the
following governorates: Sana’a, Dhamar, Al Mahweet, Sa’dah (North), Taiz, Ibb
(South), Hajjah, Hodiedah (West), Ma’arib, and Al Beida (East).
4 An exception is Senegal, where periodic abstinence was excluded from the list of
contraceptive methods in the 1986 DHS. For consistency, abstinence is excluded
from the list of methods in the 1997 DHS.
5 Women who are contraceptively sterilized, or whose husbands are sterilized, are
classified as not wanting additional children. Those who are undecided about
whether or not they want additional children—a small fraction in all surveys, the
largest being 11 percent in the 1978 WFS in Kenya—are classified as wanting
additional children.
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6 Bangladesh presents a special problem. In the 1976 WFS, women were asked if
they wanted an additional child “soon.” For comparability with this eccentric
wording, in the 1996 DHS, women who state they want no more children are
combined with women who want to delay the next birth for at least two years.
(This procedure assumes that “soon” in the 1976 WFS means within two years.)
In both Bangladesh surveys, therefore, the contrast is between those women who
want another child soon and those women who want to postpone or stop child-
bearing.
7 This information is provided in the surveys for Bangladesh, Colombia, Domini-
can Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Morocco, Peru, and Turkey.
8 Current pregnancies are excluded in figuring the actual number of children. This
exclusion results in equivalent treatment of pregnant women on the two prefer-
ence variables, as explained above; for a pregnant woman her desire for another
child refers to the time when she became pregnant, rather than her desire for
another child after the termination of her current pregnancy.
9 Ideal number of children is missing for some respondents, usually because the
woman replied with a nonnumeric response (such as “whatever God wishes”). In
about one-fourth (12) of the surveys, more than 10 percent of respondents gave a
nonnumeric response. The highest proportion of nonnumeric responses is 43 per-
cent in the 1979 WFS in Yemen. In about one-half of the surveys (22), fewer than
5 percent gave a nonnumeric response. In all these cases, the ideal number of
children is imputed via a regression equation. For those women who gave a nu-
meric response, ideal number of children is regressed on age, woman’s and
partner’s years of schooling, rural-urban residence, and partner’s occupation. The
resulting regression equation is used to calculate a predicted ideal number of
children for those women lacking a numeric response. The predicted value is
rounded to the nearest integer.
10 Because contraception is represented by a binary variable—use and nonuse—
logistic regressions are estimated. The desire for an additional child is repre-
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sented by a dummy variable, and the difference between actual and ideal number
of children is a continuous variable. Sampling weights are applied.
11 The decomposition methodology adopted for this analysis eliminates the interac-
tion component present in some decomposition approaches by using as weights,
in the calculation of the decomposition, averages of the values for the two sur-
veys (Iams and Thornton 1975). See equation (3).
12 Increased rates of use among those who do not desire additional children repre-
sent increased implementation of stopping preferences. Increased rates of use
among those who desire more children can reflect either increased implementa-
tion of spacing preferences or an increase in the fraction wishing to space; the
two are mixed together in this analysis. Other research indicates, however, that
birth-spacing preferences change little over the course of fertility transition, and
hence in most countries increased rates of use among those who desire more
children can be assumed to result mainly from increased implementation of spac-
ing preferences.
13 Because a regression decomposition is used, the composition component can be
calculated on the basis of one of the two measures to exceed the composition
component based on the two measures, an outcome that, on the face of it, seems
illogical. This outcome occurs in 10 of 44 comparisons in Table 4, but in only
four of these does it amount to as much as a two percentage-point discrepancy.
These discrepancies occur when the decrease in the absolute value of one regres-
sion coefficient (for example, desire for additional children) is not compensated
for by the additional contribution to the decomposition of changes in the other
variable (for example, actual–ideal gap).






where U is the proportion using contraception, p denotes preference category
(“want more” or “want no more”), and s denotes survey (first or second survey).
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This transform is applied to the proportion practicing contraception in each pref-
erence category for each survey. The difference between preference categories is
then calculated for each survey.
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